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The Economic Burden of Taxation
William A. Niskanen
he many burdens of government include those attributable to taxation,
monetary policy, regulations, and restrictions on civil liberties. This paper
is specific to the economic burden of taxation, without in any way mini-
mizing the other types of burdens.
1
THE MODEL
The economic burden of taxation is a function of three conditions: the
level of the average tax rate, the relation of the marginal tax rate to the average
tax rate, and the response of the tax base to changes in the marginal tax rate.
2
Start with the basic relation of the size of the economy to the two major
fiscal decisions:
(1) Y = aG
b(1 – R)
c
where Y = GDP per potential worker,
G = expenditures for government services (excluding defense)
per potential worker, and
R = the average tax rate.
The two major fiscal decisions, of course, are the level of expenditures for
government services (excluding defense) and the level of the average tax rate.
This equation is expressed in terms of output per potential worker to capture the
effects of G and (1 – R) on both hours worked per potential worker and on out-
put per worker hour. The implicit assumption in this equation is that government
expenditures for defense, transfer payments, interest payments, and subsidies
have no significant net effect on the output per potential worker; there is ample
evidence, of course, that most transfer payments reduce output per potential
worker. The elasticity c, as I will demonstrate, reflects the combined effects of
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the relation of the marginal tax rate to the average tax rate times the elasticity of
Y with respect to one minus the marginal tax rate. For the moment, pay no atten-
tion to the G variable; at the end of the paper, I will return to discuss the effects
of the combination of G and R on the optimal size of government.
Given Equation 1, tax revenues per potential worker are
(2) T = RY = aG
bR(1 – R)
c
and the output per potential worker net of taxes is 
(3) N = Y – T = aG
b(1 – R)
(1 + c).
The marginal economic burden of taxation, thus, is the change in net out-
put per unit increase in tax revenues. Some manipulation of Equations 1 and 2
yields the following equation for the marginal economic burden:
(4) ∂N/∂T = – [(1 + c)(1 – R)]/[1 – (1 + c)R].  
Equation 4, plus the observed data for the average tax rate and an estimate
of the elasticity c, thus, is sufficient to estimate the quantitative magnitude of the
marginal economic burden of taxation. If the elasticity c = 0, of course, the
reduction in net GDP is equal to the increase in tax revenues, and there is no
deadweight loss of the additional taxes. The marginal cost of taxation, however,
increases rapidly as a function of both c and R.
Before presenting my estimates of the relevant parameters, however, I
promised to address the effects of the structure of the tax system, more specif-
ically the relation between the marginal and average tax rates. A more precise
formulation of Equation 1 would include the marginal tax rate M rather than the
average tax rate R in the term in parentheses. For two reasons, however, I have
chosen to use the average tax rate R: There are no available data on the income-
weighted aggregate marginal tax rate or agreed procedures for estimating this
rate. And, since T = RY, the average tax rate must be used in Equation 2, adding
an undetermined variable to the model. If the marginal tax rate M, however, is
a function of the average tax rate R, the average tax rate can be used in both
equations. For example, if
(5) M = –x + yR,
then
(6) (1 – R)
c = (1 + x – yR)
z
and the relation between c and z is
(7) c = yz[(1 – R)/(1 + x – yR)]. 
The elasticity c, thus, is seen to be the product of the marginal effect of R on M and
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either an increase in the progressivity of the tax structure (the parameter y) or an
increase in the adverse economic effect of the marginal tax rate (the parameter z).
THE ELASTICITIES
For this study, the elasticities b and c of Equation 1 are estimated by two
independent techniques. The first technique is to estimate the long-term relation
between fiscal choices and economic outcomes in the United States. For this
purpose, several economic growth equations were estimated by two-stage least
squares regressions, based on a sample of annual U.S. data from 1964 through
1999. Equations were estimated for the annual change of three dimensions of
economic growth:
– real GDP per potential worker,
– output per hour in the business sector, and
– hours worked in the business sector per potential worker.
The primary fiscal measures in these regressions are the annual change in
real expenditures for government services (excluding defense) per potential
worker, one minus the average tax rate, and one minus the average tax rate in
the second prior year. The first equation is sufficient to estimate the elasticities
for this study, but the other equations were estimated to identify the relative
effects of the fiscal choices on productivity and hours worked. 
The second technique is to estimate the elasticities b and c that are implicit
in the actual levels of G and R for the United States in 1996, given the model of
the fiscal choices of democratic governments developed in my book. In effect,
this involves solving my model of democratic government backwards from the
known fiscal choices in 1996 to the elasticities that are consistent with these
choices. The finding that the elasticities estimated by these two techniques are
quite close may be an indirect validation of my model of the fiscal choices of
democratic governments.
Table 1 presents the estimates of the elasticities of fiscal effects from these
two techniques. 
The other regressions on the changes in productivity and hours worked
suggest that about half of the effect of tax changes on short-run economic
growth operate through changes in productivity and about half through changes
in hours worked. The estimated effect of the after-tax rate on hours worked is
consistent with a large number of other studies, most of which have neglected
to estimate the effect on productivity. In the long run, however, about two-thirds
of the effect of tax changes on economic growth operate through changes in
productivity, because there is no significant difference between the short-run
and long-run effects on hours worked. The finding that the implicit estimate of
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regression may suggest that our government takes into account only the short-
run effects on output of changes in taxes. 
THE MARGINAL ECONOMIC BURDEN OF TAXATION
Now we can address the primary topic of this paper. Table 2 presents esti-
mates of the marginal economic burden of taxation from Equation 4 for a range
of the variable R and the elasticity c. These numbers, again, are the marginal
reduction in output (or income) after taxes per additional dollar of government
tax revenue. 
Given that the elasticity c implicit in recent U.S. fiscal conditions is about
0.8 and the average tax rate is about 0.3, the marginal cost of government
spending and taxes in the United States may be about $2.75 per additional dol-
lar of tax revenue. One wonders whether there are any government programs
for which the marginal value is that high. Given the estimate of the long-term
elasticity  c from the U.S. time-series data, the marginal cost of government
spending and taxes may be as high as $4.50 at the current average tax rate. The
cost estimate in a benefit-cost study of any program financed by general taxes
Table 1




c (short run) .748 .772
(.127)
c (long run) 1.212 
(.164)
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimates from the regression equation.
Table 2




.4 1.556 1.690 1.909
.8 2.250 2.739 3.857
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should be multiplied by the relevant number from this table. All of these esti-
mates, of course, increase as a function of both c and R and approach infinity
as R nears the revenue-maximizing tax rate.
SOME OTHER INTERESTING ESTIMATES
The model and the empirical estimates of Equation 1 also provide a basis
for estimating several other interesting magnitudes: the revenue-maximizing
average tax rate, the net output maximizing level of G, and the net excess bur-
den of maintaining a 30 percent average tax rate given the optimal level of G.
The maximum average tax rate is determined from Equation 2 by setting
the derivative of T with respect to R equal to zero; this yields the following
equation for the maximum R:
(8) R = 1/(1 + c).
As the equation indicates, the revenue-maximizing average tax rate
declines with an increase in the elasticity c, whether caused by an increase in
the progressivity of the tax system or an increase of the elasticity of output with
respect to one minus the marginal tax rate. 
The level of G that maximizes net output is determined from Equation 3
by setting the derivative of N with respect to G equal to zero; this yields the fol-
lowing equation for the optimal ratio of G to Y:
(9) G/Y = b/(1 + c).
As this equation indicates, the optimal domestic spending share of GDP
increases with the elasticity b and declines with the elasticity c. This has always
presented somewhat of a dilemma for tax reformers; a reduction of the pro-
gressivity of the tax structure is likely to lead to an increase in the relative size
of government spending because it reduces the marginal cost of additional
spending. My own suggestion is that approval of any broad-based, flat-rate tax
reform should be accompanied by a change of the voting rule to require a
supermajority vote for any subsequent increase in the base or rate.
The net excess burden of taxation is also estimated from Equation 3 by
calculating the net output if R = .3 (roughly what it has been in the United States
for some years) relative to the net output if R is sufficient to finance only the
optimal level of G. This is a rough estimate of the loss of net output from set-
ting an average tax rate sufficient to finance government spending for defense,
transfer payments, etc., in addition to the optimal level of G.
Table 3 presents these other interesting estimates for several levels of the
elasticity c. All of the calculations of the optimal level of G/Y and the net excess
burden are based on the elasticity b = .2, as there seems little uncertainty about
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As expected, the revenue-maximizing average tax rate declines sharply
with an increase in the elasticity c; this rate would be the peak of any Laffer
curve expressed in terms of the average tax rate and is the ultimate limit on the
sustainable level of government spending relative to GDP. The optimal level of
expenditures for government services (excluding defense) relative to GDP also
declines with an increase in the elasticity c but to a level that is not much lower
than recent experience; in 2001, for example, government consumption expen-
ditures and gross investment, excluding defense, were 14.5 percent of GDP.
Given an estimate of the elasticity c that reflects the effects of the after-tax rate
on both the supply of labor and on productivity, the optimal level of G is about
10 percent of GDP, a relative level of G that Milton Friedman has supported for
many years. The net excess burden of taxation beyond that necessary to finance
the optimal level of G, however, increases with the elasticity c. This column
indicates that the net economic cost to the economy of a level of total spend-
ing and taxes beyond that necessary to finance the optimal level of G increases
from about 25 percent of net potential output if c = .4 to about 44 percent of
net potential output if c = 1.2. This does not suggest that there is no value to
government spending above the optimal level of G, only that the net cost to the
economy of this spending is much higher than the direct expenditures for these
programs. 
For those of you who may wish to pursue these issues in the larger con-
text of the fiscal choices of alternative political regimes, I encourage you to read
my book. 
NOTES
1 Most of this paper is a summary of some footnotes in my new book, Autocratic, Democratic, and
Optimal Government: Fiscal Choices and Economic Outcomes, published by Edward Elgar in
February 2004. 
2 The standard reference article on this issue is by Edgar K. Browning (1987), “The Marginal Wel-
fare Cost of Taxation,” American Economic Review 77: 11–23.
Table 3
Some Other Interesting Estimates
Maximum R Optimal G/Y Net Burden
c
.4 .714 .143 .247
.8 .556 .111 .350
1.2 .455 .091 .437